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The German Federal Election of 2017: How the
Wedge Issue of Refugees and Migration Took
the Shine off Chancellor Merkel and
Transformed the Party System
J €ORG MICHAEL DOSTAL
Abstract
The 2017 German federal election delivered dramatic electoral decline of the two traditional
main parties, the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD),
who had governed Germany in a ‘grand coalition’ government since 2013. The main reason
for this outcome was the decision by Chancellor Angela Merkel to open Germany’s borders
for refugees and migrants, an unprecedented policy that abandoned border controls and
remained in place between September 2015 and March 2016. This article focuses on how the
refugee and migration problem subsequently turned into a wedge issue, splitting most Ger-
man political parties and handing a major election victory to the main critics of Merkel’s deci-
sion, namely the rightist Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the right-wing liberals of the
Free Democratic Party (FDP). Rather than explaining these developments in isolation, the arti-
cle highlights how past welfare state retrenchment and fear over future economic prosperity
make signiﬁcant groups of the electorate, including former supporters of left-of-centre parties,
lose conﬁdence in the ability of the political system to deliver stability and social integration.
Keywords: Angela Merkel, Germany, German party system, migration policy, refugee
policy, social policy, wedge issue
Introduction: German politics
since uniﬁcation
EXPLAINING THE CURRENT state of German poli-
tics requires a short review of the larger pic-
ture. Since the country’s reuniﬁcation in
1990, three Chancellors have held ofﬁce:
Christian Democrat Helmut Kohl until 1998,
Social Democrat Gerhard Schr€oder between
1998 and 2005 and Christian Democrat
Angela Merkel since 2005. The period
directly after uniﬁcation gave rise to a short-
term economic boom, during which West
German companies gained access to 16 mil-
lion new East German consumers. This
boom, based on the pent-up demand for
West German consumer goods in the East,
quickly ﬁzzled out. The lasting result of this
episode was the near complete disappear-
ance of East German industry followed by a
rapid rise in East German unemployment to
levels that have been high ever since. In
order to deal with the social costs of uniﬁca-
tion, the existing structures of the West Ger-
man welfare state, such as unemployment
and pension insurance, were used to manage
the post-uniﬁcation economic decline in the
East. This contributed to the ﬁscal crisis of
the German welfare state, undermining the
country’s social market economy that had,
until then, been based on a consensus model
that brought employers, trade unions and
the state together in decision-making on
social protection issues.
A second major development since uniﬁ-
cation has been demographic decline. Ger-
many has become a low fertility society
with birth rates near the very bottom by
global comparison. Policy efforts to make
raising children in Germany more attractive
have so far had nearly no impact on the
low birth rate.All German sources translated by the author.
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Post-uniﬁcation politics has essentially
been characterised by three major pathbreak-
ing decisions, in 2003, 2008 and 2015, respec-
tively, each signiﬁcantly changing the
German polity. The ﬁrst one was welfare
state retrenchment during the so-called
‘Hartz reforms’ of the red-green (SPD and
Green party) government of Chancellor Ger-
hard Schr€oder that took place from 2003 and
was also supported by the then opposition
CDU/CSU. The essential feature of this
retrenchment was radically to cut entitle-
ments for core workers in the event of unem-
ployment, by introducing time limits on
social insurance beneﬁts or by removing
social insurance altogether in favour of
means-tested welfare payments that were
only available after the unemployed had
used up nearly all of their personal savings.
In parallel, pension levels were also cut—
again based on an agreement between SPD
and CDU/CSU.
It is hard to overstate how unpopular
these reforms were and still are in the con-
text of German politics. They dramatically
weakened the SPD, which has since lost
more than half of its former electorate.
According to one former SPD party chair-
man, ‘proud ship building workers who paid
all their life contributions to social insurance
are suddenly, at the advanced age of 56,
turned into welfare recipients and social out-
siders. This they have not forgiven us.’1 Elec-
toral decline of the SPD aside, the political
net result of the Hartz reforms was the rapid
expansion of low-wage and non-standard
forms of employment in a deregulated
labour market, in which the share of the
working poor has grown rapidly.
The second major turning point, somehow
more difﬁcult to summarise as it is still play-
ing out today, was the reaction of German
policy-makers to the global ﬁnancial crisis
starting in 2007 and escalating in 2008. This
crisis questioned the survival of the banking
system and even of global capitalism, and
was ‘solved’ by the taxpayer ‘rescuing’ the
banks. This move turned the banking crisis
into a public budget crisis. In the German
context, most people feared that the real
economy would be negatively affected by
the events in the ﬁnancial sector and the
rapid increase in public deﬁcits. Yet this did
not happen. Instead, Germany entered a
period of economic recovery that was at
least partially based on structural changes,
such as the lower external value of the euro
that facilitated German exports. Yet some of
the rapid adaption to the global crisis was
also due to the rediscovery of nearly forgot-
ten German virtues, such as unions and
employers in the car industry coming
together to save jobs by coordinated cuts in
working hours. Another policy instrument,
the so-called Abwrackpr€amie (scrappage allow-
ance), brought the state in to facilitate the
purchase of new cars. Yet these developments
did not restore earlier neo-corporatist ways of
decision making; they amounted to the ﬁnal
hour of glory of the past system.
Soon after, Germany’s economic recovery
acquired the characteristics of an artiﬁcially
engineered boom. At the centre of this boom
was (and is) the European Central Bank,
which, under the leadership of Mario Dra-
ghi, has turned towards a zero interest rate
policy in order to ‘save’ the euro. In his
famous remark on 26 July 2012, Draghi pro-
mised to do ‘whatever it takes’ to retain the
common currency. This real life macroeco-
nomic experiment in ‘free money’ is the
main reason for Germany’s current day eco-
nomics, namely a rapid rise in real estate
prices and a stock market boom (no surprise
here from a British perspective). The other
side of the coin is the slow, but steady
decline in the value of money savings,
eroded by minimal interest rates that are
kept below the rate of inﬂation. Overall,
Germans were, pre-euro, used to a stable
currency—a major difference to the Mediter-
ranean capitalisms and the British model—
rather than the soft currency policies of the
current period that silently redistribute
wealth between different asset holders and
facilitate speculation in real estate. The net
result of these monetary policies has been a
split within the bourgeois centre of German
politics, between the supporters of Merkel’s
muddling through and those who demand a
return to macroeconomic stability in line
with pre-crisis views of what constitutes
‘solid’ economics.
Third, Chancellor Merkel’s decision to
open temporarily Germany’s borders to refu-
gees and migrants without any border
checks, on 4 September 2015, was certainly
the most controversial single step of her
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political career and is still contested today.
The next section, therefore, discusses the
major policy issues that have had decisive
inﬂuence on the outcome of the German
federal election of 2017, in order of their
respective signiﬁcance.
Main issues in the 2017 German
federal election
There exists general agreement in recent
opinion polls that the refugee and migration
issue is by far the most frequently stated sin-
gle concern in people’s minds when thinking
about their election choice. One representa-
tive study, allowing multiple responses, sug-
gested that 44 per cent of people interviewed
considered the refugee and migration issues
signiﬁcant, while 20 per cent mentioned
social injustice and poverty, 14 per cent edu-
cation and schools, 12 per cent unemploy-
ment and labour market issues, and 11 per
cent crime levels and law and order.2
Another study, conducted slightly earlier
and using a similar methodology, produced
almost identical results, namely 56 per cent
expressed concern over migration and inte-
gration issues, 17 per cent highlighted pov-
erty—often with reference to anxiety over
future lower pension levels—while 16 per
cent each mentioned crime and unemploy-
ment, 14 per cent pensions and old-age secu-
rity and, 12 per cent each, the cost of living
and education policies.3 One can sum up
these ﬁndings, in the sense that economic
and social issues—promising topics for left-
of-centre parties—feature prominently on the
public agenda. Nevertheless, all of these
issues are still secondary when compared to
the refugee and migration problem.
Refugees and migration: the ultimate
wedge issue
It is hardly possible to overstate how refugee
and migration issues have, since September
2015, become the ultimate ‘wedge’ issue of
German politics. Yet what actually happened
in terms of the German government’s policy
choices in September 2015 still remains con-
tested today. This lack of clarity starts with
the demarcation between the two terms
‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’. In the former case,
the German, EU and international legal
order suggests that refugee status might be
granted to those facing individual persecu-
tion in their country of origin due to their
race, religion, nationality or political beliefs.
In addition, those ﬂeeing armed conﬂicts,
such as the one in Syria, might be granted
temporary protective status (subsidi€arer
Schutz), but not refugee status, until the end
of a conﬂict allows repatriation. There is no
initial expectation that the protective status
will result in permanent residency in Ger-
many. In the latter case of migration, there is
the expectation that newcomers will inte-
grate into German society and the labour
market in a way that beneﬁts both sides. In
practice, the terms have been used without
any clear distinction by politicians and the
media, although critics have stressed that
such distinctions are crucial in order to
provide legitimate and transparent policy-
making with regard to the question of who
qualiﬁes for temporary or permanent resi-
dency in Germany. In order to highlight the
unclear demarcation between the two groups
of people, the remainder of the article uses
both terms.
The supporters of Merkel argue that her
policy of ‘Grenz€offnung f€ur Fl€uchtlinge’, that
is, the ‘opening of borders for refugees’ (one
should note that the German noun for the
opening of borders makes Germans remem-
ber the opening of the intra-German borders
in 1989), was a humanitarian response to an
emergency situation, triggered by the Hun-
garian government’s inability to take care of
large numbers of refugees congregating in
the Hungarian capital of Budapest. Accord-
ing to some observers, this resulted in the
‘spontaneous’ decision on the part of the
refugees to walk to the Austrian and Ger-
man borders. This refugee movement, it is
said, could only have been stopped by vio-
lent means, and Merkel decided under the
pressure of events to accept the entry of
refugees into Germany without any border
controls.4
Merkel’s critics suggest, however, that her
policy amounted to ‘chaotische und unreg-
ulierte Masseneinwanderung’ (‘chaotic and
unregulated mass migration’). They consider
the opening of borders to be an irresponsible
act from the point of view of the native pop-
ulation. Even moderate critics, who might
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accept that Merkel was under pressure at the
moment of taking her initial decision, criti-
cise her for abusing her executive privilege
as Chancellor in failing to ask for input from
the German parliament or for consultations
with other EU member countries. They also
raise questions about the unclear legal foun-
dations of Merkel’s decision.5 Moreover, crit-
ics hold that her unwillingness to close the
borders for many months after the initial
decision—the borders remained open until
March 2016 when a ‘deal’ with Turkey
closed down the so-called ‘Balkan route’—
encouraged more and more refugees and
migrants to move to Germany. This splitting
of the EU over refugee and migration issues
—that continues today—has triggered high
costs for Germany as a host society or per-
manent destination for refugees and
migrants who turned out to be mostly (ap-
proximately 70 per cent) young men from
North Africa, the Middle East and other
Muslim-majority societies. While Syrians
form the largest refugee group, making up
around a third of all people applying for
asylum in 2015, the majority of those enter-
ing Germany had no common country of ori-
gin or joint cultural reference point.
Subsequent events, such as the large-scale
sexual violence against women in public
places in Cologne, Hamburg and some other
German cities on New Year’s Eve 2015—
crimes that were initially downplayed by the
German police authorities and that ulti-
mately, in summer 2016, were declared to
have involved around 1,200 female victims
and around 2,000 foreign perpetrators, at
least half of them believed to have been
recent arrivals—have signiﬁcantly changed
public attitudes towards refugees and
migrants. According to Holger M€unch, the
head of the German Federal Crime Police
(BKA), ‘there is a connection between the
emergence of this phenomenon and the
rapid migration in 2015’.6 One year later,
the terror attack on the Christmas market in
Berlin on 19 December 2016 left twelve peo-
ple dead and ﬁfty-six people injured—the
ﬁrst Islamist attack on this scale in Germany.
The terrorist in question, who was lethally
shot four days later by police in Italy, was of
Tunisian origin and had entered Germany in
June 2015 after a previous four-year jail
term in Italy for drug-related offences.
Signiﬁcantly, the police and public authori-
ties’ response to this attack was once again
characterised by delays, poor communication
with victims’ families and even the manipu-
lation of police ﬁles to cover up shortcom-
ings in police work.7
Here is not the space to review these
events further. Decisive in the context of the
federal elections is that the topic has not lost
its relevance due to policy changes on the
part of Chancellor Merkel—changes such as
the German government’s agreement with
Turkey of March 2016 to stop the further
entering of refugees and migrants over the
so-called ‘Balkan route’. (Turkey has since
built a wall on the Turkish–Syrian border to,
in turn, stop Syrians from entering Turkey).
In fact, the refugee and migration issue
continues to split all political camps across
multiple dimensions. In order to understand
better why the topic has turned into the ulti-
mate wedge issue, a good point of departure
is to realise that the actual policy motivation
since September 2015 has been inherently
ambiguous. On the one hand, it was argued
that we (that is, ‘the Germans’) help refugees
because it is the morally right thing to do.
Yet, at the same time, it was also suggested
that by allowing refugees and migrants into
Germany, the Germans were actually help-
ing themselves. Was it not the case, many
claimed, that the refugees, being on average
young and at the beginning of their working
lives, might turn out to be a blessing for the
German labour market? Were they not
bound to be future contributors to the Ger-
man pension system? From this second utili-
tarian point of view, the refugees were
expected to be useful for the host society, at
least in the medium and long term. Yet the
two points of view were in contradiction
with each other. The ﬁrst one was based on
pure ethics and demanded the opening of
borders to those who were ﬂeeing unaccept-
able living conditions. This position sug-
gested that establishing clear distinctions
between ‘political refugees’ and ‘economic
migrants’ was difﬁcult or impossible. How-
ever, the second point of view was close to
neoliberal concepts of what one might term
a ‘breathing labour market’. This second
position is in the German context referred to
as the ‘Canadian model’, that is, the manage-
ment of migration according to a scoring
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system that selects migrants based on their
economic usefulness.8 Needless to say, that
reality failed to follow either of these two
paradigms, thereby leaving observers con-
fused about what was going on.
Four dimensions of the wedge issue
Looking further at the wedge issue of refu-
gees and migrants, one might highlight at
least four politically signiﬁcant dimensions,
namely, (1) a temporal dimension; (2) a
media discourse dimension; (3) an ideologi-
cal dimension; and (4) a psychological
dimension. The ﬁrst two dimensions might
be described as communication issues and
the latter two as substantive ones. To begin
with, the temporal dimension refers to the
transition from happiness to fear about the
arrival of refugees. Initially, in late 2015,
there was euphoria about the idea that Ger-
many could and should help refugees. This
turned into a pervasive fear that ‘our’ coun-
try is bound to become the site of major reli-
gious and value conﬂicts, bringing crime,
large-scale disorder and, perhaps, the disap-
pearance of German culture as we know it.
Thus there was a dramatic overshooting in
public debate, from a na€ıve ‘welcome cul-
ture’ to a deep-seated fear that German soci-
ety might face existential threats due to its
demographic decline when challenged by
large cohorts of young migrants.
The temporal overshoot from euphoria to
depression was to a large extent driven by
the discourse of the legacy media, that is,
state-run TV stations and the print media.
These media outlets have subsequently been
blamed for their one-sided framing of the
events that took off following the decision to
open Germany’s borders in September 2015.
Journalists became activists in spreading a
welcome culture that originated with Mer-
kel’s grand coalition government and civil
society associations such as the Christian
churches. The strength of this initial welcome
culture stemmed from a combination of elite
discourse and strong moral conviction on
the part of its advocates. Until the punctur-
ing of this phenomenon by the Cologne
events, it was very difﬁcult to voice concern
over the unregulated movement of people
into Germany without being excluded from
representation in the mainstream media.
Those who were critical of the ongoing
events and expressed fear of the entry of
Islamist networks from the war zones in the
Middle East and North Africa, and sought
controls on what was, according to existing
EU and national legislation, ‘illegal migra-
tion’, were sometimes accused of being xeno-
phobic or racist, but more often they were
just ignored. Yet this singlemindedness on
the part of the legacy media in spreading the
welcome message was far from being uni-
versally shared by the general public. In fact,
earlier opinion polls deriving from 2014, sug-
gested that a majority of Germans were con-
cerned about migration levels—much lower
at the time of these earlier polls—while also
believing that the political class ignored such
concerns.9 In short, there was a split between
government and elite discourse on the one
side, and a large strand of popular opinion
on the other. Because of this genuine split in
public attitudes, the online media ﬁlled the
gap in critical reporting which, in turn,
quickly became radicalised. Soon after, off-
line and online opinion makers started to
blame each other for misleading the public
for reasons that were morally repugnant.
Perhaps the most signiﬁcant wedge con-
cerned political ideology. All political parties
from left to right experienced divisions over
the refugee and migration issue. The most
dramatic split appeared among mainstream
conservatives, that is, the rank and ﬁle of the
Christian Democrats. In some respects, these
splits since 2015 are comparable with the
splits within the SPD electorate back in 2003,
which had been produced by the Hartz
reforms. What has happened is that the
CDU and CSU have lost a large share of
their national conservative wings, leaving
only the market liberal and Christian social
wings and thereby narrowing their electoral
appeal signiﬁcantly. This split within Ger-
man Christian Democracy has occurred in a
silent manner and without any explicit col-
lective withdrawal, although several leading
members of the Alternative for Germany
(AfD) are sometime CDU members, or draw
support from CDU conservatives who have
given up their afﬁliation. For the time being,
the AfD has inherited an entire political
group alienated from one of Germany’s
major parties. Their conviction is that Mer-
kel’s migration policies question the cultural
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identity of Germany, namely the Judaeo-
Christian tradition, and open the doors to
creeping Islamisation.
One of the two current AfD leaders,
Alexander Gauland, spent his previous polit-
ical life between 1973 and 2013 in the CDU.
His long-term friend Erika Steinbach (a retir-
ing former CDU Member of the federal
parliament, long-term representative of the
national conservatives in the CDU and now
former CDU member), suggested in a speech
addressing an AfD election rally that
Merkel’s withdrawal from nuclear energy,
announced in reaction to the nuclear disaster
in Fukushima in 2011, ‘puts forward the
Morgenthau plan’, namely the idea of the
then US Secretary of the Treasury Henry
Morgenthau, Jr, who had in the ﬁnal stages
of World War II proposed to deindustrialise
Germany in order to turn it into an agricul-
tural society. Yet, her main complaint was
the ‘Chancellor’s decision for the uncon-
trolled and unlimited acceptance of
migrants’ and the failure of the public
authorities to punish those refugees and
migrants who had presented falsiﬁed pass-
ports to the German authorities.10 Without
going into further detail, one must stress that
the split between the national conservatives,
blaming the Chancellor for repeated offences
against the legal order, and Merkel’s CDU is
now too deep to be ﬁxed.
Chancellor Merkel, the Finance Minister
Wolfgang Sch€auble, and Horst Seehofer,
the leader of the Bavarian sister party of
the CDU, the CSU, have all tried to turn the
refugee and migration related issues into
‘normal’ policy-making problems. The open
border policies were ended in March 2016
with the result that the number of refugees
and migrants has declined from its peak in
the second half of 2015 and early 2016. Nev-
ertheless, overall levels of migration to Ger-
many have remained high compared to
previous years. The promise made by the
German government in 2015 to allow the
admission of family members of those
granted refugee status, such as Syrians, con-
tinues to produce anxiety among the Ger-
man electorate about a ‘second wave’ of
newcomers. In order to calm down such con-
cerns, a bundle of legislative initiatives was
passed by the German federal parliament in
February 2016. This included not accepting
requests for family reunions for two years,
which can be seen as an attempt to keep the
issue off the agenda during the election sea-
son.
Nevertheless, all such efforts at political
triangulation and compromise failed. In par-
ticular, Chancellor Merkel continued to stress
her unwillingness to introduce upper numer-
ical limits on the right to ‘political asylum’
(a right enshrined in the German Constitu-
tion), while not clarifying how this related to
the large-scale inﬂow of migrants who were
not suffering from direct political persecu-
tion. In the meantime, Sch€auble worked
behind the scenes in order to make Turkey
cooperate in efforts to close the ‘Balkan route’
for refugees and migrants. In turn, Seehofer
stressed his achievement in having the non-
EU Balkan states—such as Albania, Kosovo
and Montenegro—declared ‘safe third states’,
thereby stopping asylum requests of nation-
als from these states in Germany and, in par-
ticular, in his own federal state of Bavaria.
These efforts all failed, however, to reunite
the Christian Democrats or to satisfy the
national conservatives. In particular, See-
hofer’s repeated attacks on Merkel in this
context, suggesting that ‘the Chancellor has
according to my conviction decided for the
vision of another republic’ and stating that
‘the population does not want this country to
become a different one’, underlined that the
CSU wanted to be seen as the stronghold of
the traditionalists of the centre-right.11 Last
but not least, Seehofer has repeatedly pro-
mised Bavarian voters that the CSU will
place upper limits on migration in any agree-
ments over the next coalition government.
This underlines that the difference of opinion
between Merkel and the CSU over migration
remains on the agenda.
These deep divisions have also affected
the centre-left parties. The SPD has been
least affected since it has mostly followed
Merkel’s policies, although the former SPD
leader Sigmar Gabriel has argued that ‘there
is a double task of integration concerning
those that have newly joined us; but also
those that have always lived here’.12 In fact,
the SPD has not focused on criticising short-
comings of the integration effort during Mer-
kel’s last grand coalition government. After
all, the SPD shared responsibility for these
policy choices. Within the Left party, the
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debate was also kept off the agenda in the
current election campaign. However, the for-
mer party chairman Oskar Lafontaine had
earlier, in February 2017, stated that ‘the call
for open borders is a central demand of
neoliberalism’ pointing out that employers
are ‘for free migration to attract qualiﬁed
workers from developing countries in order
to use increased migration to increase wage
competition’. In addition, Lafontaine stressed
that the control of migration levels was the
‘foundation of state order’, while his wife
and co-chair of the Left party, Sahra Wagen-
knecht, argued that Merkel shared responsi-
bility for the Islamist attack in Berlin due to
her ‘uncontrolled opening of borders’ and
earlier cuts in the number of police person-
nel.13
Finally, a fourth dimension of the wedge
issue is the psychological aspect. Many
observers of the debate see German attitudes
with regard to refugees and migrants as
deriving from personal negative experiences
that came with the loss of control that glob-
alisation has imposed on the sense of histori-
cal continuity in a local cultural context.
Overall, this line of thinking relates to the
long-standing concern in German sociology
with the winners and losers of modernisa-
tion. According to observers, openness to
other cultures and positive expectations with
regard to multiculturalism will be more
prevalent in periods of relative social peace,
while own experiences of economic precari-
ousness and social exclusion—or fear of
experiencing them in the future—will make
people hostile to further immigration and
turn them into cultural protectionists.
In addition, the long-standing experience
of German society with low fertility levels
produced in many observers a degree of cul-
tural fatalism. Are the Germans not set to
disappear from the stage of history? One of
the prominent thinkers in this context is
Gunnar Heinsohn, a senior German scholar,
who has turned the theoretical concept of
the ‘youth bulge’ (the observation that high
numbers of unattached young males in high-
fertility societies might trigger a rise in gen-
eral insecurity and a tendency toward war)
into a general framework for explaining
likely future scenarios for European societies.
In his thinking, population growth in
‘young’ African societies must produce
conﬂicts with the ‘aged’ European societies.
The strength of this argument, delivered at
the ‘meta level’ of a cyclical view of history,
should not be underestimated as a potential
inﬂuence on popular attitudes to refugees
and migrants.14
Another line of thinking, located at the
level of individuals, is the suggestion that
the ‘losers’ among the native German popu-
lation lack the experience of exercising their
own agency: ‘As more people are disap-
pointed and depressed, as more they feel
alienated . . . as more radical is their need to
develop a strategy of building walls. The
threatening world should be pushed back,
the relationship with it should be cut.’15
Another author claims that ‘the most impor-
tant political success of the right-wing in
2016 was to place the movement of refugees
in the everyday reasoning of large sectors of
the population as a metaphor for the general
loss of political control. This way, the
demand for closed borders becomes a sym-
bol for the restoration of popular sover-
eignty’.16
While this line of psychological reasoning
reminds one of efforts of Wilhelm Reich in
his Mass Psychology of Fascism17 to explain
the support for the Nazi movement among
working class constituencies as being due to
authoritarian socialisation and sexual repres-
sion, one must nevertheless highlight blatant
shortcomings too. Speciﬁcally, it is too easy
to claim that the right-wing ‘placed’ the
issue in people’s minds as a ‘symbol’.
Rather, the loss of political control was very
real, and people were left alone with their
fear that open borders and unchecked enter-
ing of people from many parts of the world
—the condition on Germany’s borders
between September 2015 and March 2016—
were bound to destabilise society to some
extent. The symbol for this was, and cur-
rently still is, Chancellor Merkel’s refusal to
place limits on migration. This very refusal
must trigger concern in the minds of voters
who have experienced Merkel over many
years as someone who has always been keen
to organise her political agenda by closely
following opinion polls. Voters cannot help
but notice that Merkel has turned into a per-
son of strong principles on the one issue
that, according to all opinion polls, is the
lead issue of concern. Why, they ask, has the
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Chancellor started to be principled on an
issue that might actually hurt her at the
ballot box?
Last, one might also highlight that the
principle of ‘one citizen–one vote’ does not
place any limits on the right of depressed
people to participate in elections in compar-
ison with those who are more happy. Thus,
initial efforts on the part of most of the
media to describe the management of refu-
gee and migration issues as successful and
to keep silent about crime and disorder—for
fear of stigmatising all refugees in the eyes
of the German public—have triggered a
strong backlash. This has helped the AfD
and, to a lesser extent, the liberal FDP, which
has also criticised Merkel’s open border poli-
cies between September 2015 and March
2016. In effect, these two parties have man-
aged to ﬁll the gap in political representation
vacated by the other parties.
Beyond the wedge issue: welfare
and social policies
Moving on from the wedge issue of refugees
and migration to the other important issues
on voters’ minds, one enters a more straight-
forward terrain. As already sketched above,
the welfare retrenchment policies of the two
main parties in the German party system at
the beginning of the twenty-ﬁrst century—
back then led by the Schr€oder-SPD and
backed up by the CDU/CSU—have under-
mined the sense of social integration and
social peace that had previously charac-
terised the German political model. The
across-the-board cuts in welfare state sys-
tems in the early 2000s—unemployment
insurance, pension replacement rate, occupa-
tional sickness insurance and others—have
stripped what used to be referred to as the
‘Bismarckian welfare state’ of its earlier con-
cern with the protection of achieved social
status. Observing this development, middle
class audiences have started to feel increased
anxiety about what would happen to them
in the case of job loss and economic down-
turns.
The clearest example of the relative weak-
ening of German welfare standards has been
the decline in projected future pension levels
in comparison with wages (the replacement
rate). Before the cuts in the pension formula
in the early 2000s, average earners with an
average record of contributions to pension
insurance could count on pension levels that
were above the means-tested social assis-
tance level (the means-tested beneﬁt of last
resort for poor people). In recent years, this
is no longer the case. The main structural
reasons for this development are the decline
of collective bargaining arrangements that
used to limit wage inequalities across sec-
tors, and the parallel growth in low wage
and temporary employment. These two
long-term developments, in turn reﬂecting
the decline of trade unions and the deregula-
tion of the labour market, have facilitated
outsourcing and fragmentation of the labour
process, resulting in the growth of new
forms of precarious employment.18 The
grand coalition government of CDU/CSU
and SPD, in ofﬁce since 2013, has failed to
control these developments. Instead, their
efforts with regard to pension policies have
further increased labour market dualism. All
recent policy initiatives with regard to pen-
sions have focused on expanding occupa-
tional pensions, a system that is not
available to workers in small companies and
in low wage and precarious employment,
and on private voluntary insurance (the so-
called ‘Riester-Rente’, named after a former
SPD labour minister, and based on ﬁnancial
products provided by banks and insurance
companies in which individual contributions
are subsidised by the state). These systems
have failed to make up for parallel cuts in
entitlements in the public pension system.
Many of today’s workers know that they
have little to expect from the current pension
system.19
During the election campaign, Merkel duly
experienced criticism of her social policy
record. One might have expected her chal-
lenger from the SPD, Martin Schulz, to lead
the charge. Yet the single TV debate between
Merkel and Schulz on 3 September 2017 was
generally considered to have been boring.
One observer summed it up as ‘a duet,
rather than a duel’ consisting of ‘lack of
actual debate’, ‘polite exchange of policy
ideas’ and ‘plenty of nodding of heads’.20
Yet this was not the case in two other TV
debates hosted by the two state TV broad-
casters (ARD and ZDF), when the Chancellor
faced a live studio audience. These TV
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events underlined the decline of deference
on the part of the German public. Merkel
unexpectedly faced two rhetorical ‘duels’:
ﬁrst with a female cleaner close to retire-
ment, who is also a member of the Left party
and a trade union representative; and, sec-
ond, in the other programme, with a young
man who is engaged in vocational training
to become a hospital nurse. In the former
case, the cleaner pointed out that she would
retire after 40 years’ work with a pension
that was below the level of social assistance,
excluding her from any form of future par-
ticipation in public life because of old-age
poverty. She described the German pension
system as inadequate when compared with
the Austrian system in which she would
receive a much higher pension with the
same employment record. In the latter case,
the nurse in training attacked the poor con-
ditions faced by hospital patients as inhu-
mane owing to extreme levels of
understafﬁng in hospital wards. Based on
his own experiences, he suggested that basic
human rights were ignored in the case of the
weak and vulnerable, and that the low
wages paid to hospital care workers would
result in future deterioration due to the
unpopularity of a line of work that was trea-
ted as a pure cost factor that needed to be
minimised.
In both cases, Merkel was hard pressed to
issue a response. In the ﬁrst case, she offered
little more than the statement that ‘I can
understand you well’. In the latter case, she
suggested, probably against her own inten-
tions, that the best way to improve terms
and conditions of care workers in hospitals
was collective action. According to Merkel ‘if
necessary, we might have to take in nurses
from European countries, for example, addi-
tionally . . . but in the tariff negotiations it
must be paid better too’. She suggested that
the male nurse should ‘see what your col-
leagues who have become mechatronic tech-
nicians earn and what you do not earn, then
we get some more pressure into it’. These
statements could be read as Merkel’s
endorsement of membership in trade unions
and a solidaristic wage policy, although they
were probably just issued in the heat of the
moment. In any case, the two questioners
gained immediate popularity on the internet
for their refusal to let Merkel get away with
her muddling through statements. The
exchanges—another member of the audience
interrupted the Chancellor stating that ‘it is a
joke what you are telling here’—were
quickly watched by hundreds of thousands
of people on the internet. One could not help
but think that citizens challenged the Chan-
cellor in a much more effective manner than
Martin Schulz, her ofﬁcial opponent.
Other potentially signiﬁcant topics of the
election campaign, such as Merkel’s
announcement that Germany would expand
its defence expenditure to 2 per cent of GDP
in line with NATO plans endorsed by US
President Donald Trump—in effect a dou-
bling of the current level—only made short-
term appearances in the election debates.
Here, SPD candidate Schulz made an effort
to challenge Merkel because of the unpopu-
larity of these ideas with the general public.
In fact, most Germans do not aspire to
defence budgets at the level of France or Bri-
tain and do not support further German mil-
itary entanglements overseas. Yet, the legacy
media did not give him much space on this
topic, and Schulz subsequently failed to take
control of this or any other issues that could
have served as a tool to challenge Merkel.
Another potentially signiﬁcant issue, the
expansion of the digital economy, was in
the meantime successfully appropriated by
the liberals of the FDP, not least because it
was not contested by the other parties. Other
major issues, such as the future of the Euro-
pean Union and/or the euro, were noticeable
by their absence from the debate. In the end,
Merkel had decided to avoid political com-
mitments of any kind before election day,
thereby leaving the voter only a choice of
placing conﬁdence in her personal leadership
or rejecting her.
Party campaigning in the 2017
federal election
This section brieﬂy sketches the parties’ cam-
paign efforts in order of their share of the
vote in the 2017 election. To begin with the
CDU: the party led a campaign focusing on
what was held to be a strong economic
record, and on Merkel as the Chancellor. The
major campaign slogan of the CDU was ‘For
a Germany in which we live well and feel
good’ while another slogan read ‘For a
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strong economy with safe jobs’. This was
criticised for its lack of substance, but in fact
did not differ much from earlier CDU cam-
paigns that had also been short on speciﬁc
policies in order to put forward a ‘catch-all’
message. As in the past, the CDU made
efforts at grassroots mobilisation by organis-
ing street rallies with the Chancellor. But
these efforts backﬁred: the number of CDU
party supporters in the streets was modest,
while they attracted large crowds of protes-
ters, especially in East Germany. They were
in effect turned into informal counter rallies
of AfD supporters chanting that Merkel
should ‘get lost’. Merkel tried to stick it out,
perhaps wishing for solidarity with her as a
person among the broader electorate, which
failed to materialise.
The CSU had earlier disagreed with the
CDU regarding Merkel’s position on refu-
gees and migrants, demanding an ofﬁcial
upper limit for annual migration in order to
avoid the appearance of ‘parallel societies’ in
Germany. This demand was put forward in
a ‘Bavaria Plan’, an alternative party mani-
festo of the CSU that differed from the one
issued by the CDU, which underlined that
the CSU feared losing voters to the AfD.
When Merkel appeared at the ﬁnal campaign
rally of the CSU on the Friday before elec-
tion day in Bavaria’s capital Munich, she
faced two kinds of crowds, namely the party
faithful placed in a gated-off section of the
meeting space that was only partially ﬁlled,
while the rest of the space further away from
her was ﬁlled with protesters, many of them
AfD supporters, trying to drown her out
with whistles. In this situation, one could
not help wondering whether the CSU leader-
ship felt that Merkel was receiving the nega-
tive feedback she deserved.
The SPD election campaign was a full-
scale failure, as was Martin Schulz as a can-
didate. While Schulz had initially created a
wave of enthusiasm within the party and in
the media due to his talk of social justice
and solidarity at the beginning of 2017, this
excitement disappeared in the months before
the election. Schulz’s major mistake was to
avoid any clear positioning. In particular, he
failed to clarify what his agenda of social
justice was supposed to be based on and to
state clearly what he wanted to do. His cam-
paign moved from mistake to mistake. The
decision to have the unpopular former Chan-
cellor Schr€oder give a speech at the SPD
election conference immediately raised the
question of whether Schulz differed substan-
tially from this predecessor. Schulz failed to
attack Merkel in any sustained manner.
When facing her during their single joint TV
debate, he suggested that Germany should
exercise more pressure to have eastern Euro-
pean states accept more refugees, instead of
highlighting the shortcomings in the man-
agement of migration in Germany and of the
many unsolved social problems related to it.
Moreover, he called voters of the AfD ‘a
shame for our country’ which came across as
arrogant, especially as former SPD voters
turned out to be the third largest group
among new AfD voters in 2017.
Overall, the SPD is today little more than
a party of ‘professional politicians’. It no
longer enjoys the support of any particular
sociological category of people, with the par-
tial exception of public sector employees and
pensioners. The party has little life left in it,
and there is no Corbyn-like ﬁgure waiting in
the wings either. All SPD candidates for
chancellor in recent times (Frank Steinmeier
in 2009, Peer Steinbr€uck in 2013 and now
Schulz) belong to the right-wing of the party,
while the left-wing has either dissolved or
entered the Left party. When Schulz
announced in the night after the election his
ﬁrm decision to have the SPD enter the
opposition benches rather than accepting the
offer of talks with Merkel to form another
grand coalition, he did so out of desperation
about the lowest ever SPD election result in
the history of post-war Germany.
As for the AfD, the party consists essen-
tially of two wings: the national conserva-
tives led by Alexander Gauland and the
neoliberals led by Alice Weidel, the two co-
chairs. Gauland was a representative of the
right wing of the CDU for four decades
before joining the AfD in 2013, while Weidel,
an economist, has a political past as member
of the Friedrich A. von Hayek Society, a
cadre group of market radicals in which she
used to rub shoulders with the current FDP
leader and various business representa-
tives.21 Both AfD wings have come together
based on their criticism of the refugee and
migration policies of the Merkel government.
The conservative wing places its emphasis
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on protecting German cultural identity,
while the neoliberals suggest that refugees
and migrants are mostly an economic bur-
den placed on the German tax payer.
The AfD has focused on the wedge issue
of refugees and migrants in order to target a
number of different social groups with con-
tradictory social interests. These target
groups are, according to an internal party
document, as follows: (1) those opposing the
‘rescue of the euro’ and the ‘European super
state’; (2) bourgeois voters with liberal and
conservative orientations opposing further
migration; (3) protest voters in general and
those opposed to ‘political correctness’; (4)
former non-voters; (5) the socially disadvan-
taged and those in declining urban areas that
support ‘order, safety and patriotism’ and
feel themselves to be ‘losers of globalisation’,
including ‘workers and the unemployed’.22
One can conclude from the 2017 election
result that the AfD has managed successfully
to appeal to each of these groups—and in
particular to former non-voters and socially
disadvantaged groups. In East Germany, the
AfD has become the second strongest party
and in the eastern federal state of Saxony,
the party overtook the CDU to become the
strongest party. Thus, the AfD has turned
itself in the eastern parts of Germany into
what one might describe as a ‘people’s
party’ in the sense in which this word has
been used in German political science,
namely it has gained votes from all sections
of society.
Turning to the pro-business liberals of the
FDP, the party focused in its campaign on
three things, namely: its young and ‘charis-
matic’ party leader Christian Lindner; the
criticism of Merkel’s immigration policies as
economically dangerous and possibly illegal;
and on ‘digitalisation’ as a topic deﬁning
the economic future of Germany. The FDP
applied similar rhetoric to the AfD as
regards the ‘failed’ migration policies of
Merkel. Yet as a market-liberal party, the
FDP still stressed that migration into the
German labour market could be a good
thing if regulated by a ‘modern’ migration
law. This implies the ‘Canadian model’ of
selecting migrants according to a scoring
system governed by their relative economic
utility as judged from the point of view of
employers.
The Left party consists of two wings with
regard to the refugee and migration issue.
The ﬁrst one could be termed ‘radical cos-
mopolitan’ and the second one ‘welfare-state
realist’. The former group is made up of sup-
porters of ‘world socialism in a single coun-
try’, since they reject drawing distinctions
between ‘political’ refugees and ‘economic
migrants’ because of humanitarian concerns
implied in the demand for ‘open borders’.
The latter group of ‘state socialists’, on the
other hand, stresses that open borders pro-
duce increased competition for limited
resources of the German welfare state and
are therefore utopian. The two wings of the
party agreed to disagree on these points,
putting forward their positions at the begin-
ning of 2017 and then dropping the issue
until election day in order to allow the party
to unify in a campaign that focused almost
exclusively on welfare policy issues.
The election results for the Left party were
mixed. While the party gained additional
votes across the former West Germany, it
suffered major losses in former East Ger-
many, where the AfD overtook the Left in
all federal states, leaving them in the third
place behind CDU and AfD. Among the
unemployed and blue collar employees, elec-
toral support for the Left fell from 23 and 12
per cent in 2013 to 11 and 10 per cent respec-
tively in 2017. Writing after the election,
Lafontaine suggested that it was wrong to
place the burdens of migration such as ‘in-
creased competition in the low wage sector,
rising rents . . . growing difﬁculties in schools
with a rising share of pupils lacking German
language skills on those that are already
losers with regard to income and wealth’.
He also stressed that ‘experience in Europe
teaches: once those people feel no longer
represented by left or social democratic par-
ties, they increasingly vote for right-wing
parties’.23
Last, the Green party has over the years
turned into a new middle class party of the
economically well-off with a ‘post-material-
ist’ approach to policy-making. The party
has mostly rejected placing upper limits on
migration. Instead, the focus of the election
campaign was placed on climate change and
efforts to turn away from a carbon economy.
Since the other parties had largely vacated
environmental issues, the Greens managed
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to achieve election results that surpassed
expectations. The Greens are now in a strong
position to enter a future government,
although without any clear policy-making
agenda.
Conclusion: the crisis behind the
crisis of the party system
The result of the German federal election of
2017 raised many questions about the future
of German politics. This conclusion brieﬂy
reviews the election results and speculates
how the broader picture of neoliberal capital-
ism and European and global crisis might
affect the future behaviour of the party-
political actors in Germany. The right-wing
AfD is the big winner of the 2017 election.
The party managed to gain around 1.2 mil-
lion votes from former non-voters and 1 mil-
lion from former CDU/CSU voters, but also
470,000 and 400,000 from former SPD and
Left party voters, respectively. The FDP as
the second winner of this election gained
nearly 1.4 million votes from the CDU/CSU
and served as the party-political option for
those who wanted to put pressure on Merkel
without voting for the AfD.24 The overall
picture is the transition to a more polarised
party system with AfD and FDP as newcom-
ers in parliament.
The formation of a coalition government
might be very difﬁcult to achieve. The two
traditional major parties, CDU/CSU and
SPD, jointly received only 53.4 per cent of
the overall vote, their lowest ever result in
German federal elections. Although the cur-
rent grand coalition government would tech-
nically hold just enough votes in parliament
to keep going, this option appears a self-
defeating strategy, especially for the SPD. At
time of writing (2 October 2017), the most
likely option is assumed to be a so-called
‘Jamaica coalition’ of CDU/CSU, FDP and
Greens. (The respective party colours black,
yellow and green make up the Jamaican
ﬂag.) The major problem of forming a
‘Jamaica coalition’ is that the leaders of the
four necessary party-political components
advance opposing views with regard to the
wedge issue of refugees and migrants. The
CSU and the FDP have both been highly
critical of Merkel’s migration policies, while
the Greens are mostly committed to a pro-
immigration platform and have suggested
founding a ‘super ministry’ for integration
policies. There appears to be plenty of reason
for the four parties to think twice about join-
ing a ‘Jamaica’ coalition government if the
price would be to disappoint their respective
core constituencies. This is particularly the
case for the Bavarian CSU, which faces
regional elections in 2018 and has already
stated that the party will not join a new gov-
ernment without clear agreements on future
migration limits.
Moving on from these mostly managerial
issues to the larger picture, one needs to
stress that refugee and migration issues
dominated the 2017 federal elections for two
main reasons. First, the entire episode of
Germany’s ‘open borders’ between Septem-
ber 2015 and March 2016 was unprecedented
in its scope and surprised the political actors.
Second, the refugee and migration crisis
occurred at a moment in time when there
were already other unprecedented problems
crowding the agenda, namely, that neoliberal
capitalism has, since the global crisis in 2008,
run on a policy of zero interest rates. Such
experimental macroeconomic policies have
made the rich richer while those who placed
their trust in a welfare state that continues to
experience permanent austerity have lost
out. Who is ultimately going to pay the price
for these policies is still unclear, and people
have good reason to worry about limited
resources.
Thus, the forming of the next German
government will have to be pursued in a dif-
ﬁcult environment. The elections have
demonstrated that Germany is divided
across multiple dimensions: social and regio-
nal divisions have spilled over into the polit-
ical system. In particular, the cuts in welfare
state entitlements and standards in the early
twenty-ﬁrst century have created a precari-
ous class of working poor that is perma-
nently excluded from participating in the
economic prosperity elsewhere. Moreover,
social and cultural divisions between West
and East continue to be signiﬁcant nearly
three decades after uniﬁcation. The 2017
election has highlighted the fact that the
party system is now increasingly regionally
structured. While the Christian Democrats
have maintained some nation-wide threshold
of support, the Social Democrats have
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declined to a North West German party with
much lower levels of support elsewhere.
Conversely, the AfD has gained strong sup-
port in East Germany and the South while
the two smaller parties that would be signiﬁ-
cant to form a ‘Jamaica coalition’, namely
the FDP and the Greens, are strong in the
former West Germany and weak in the for-
mer East Germany. In summary, the inability
of the political system to deliver stability
and social integration is reﬂected in the sheer
difﬁculty of forming a government. In this
environment, the wedge issue of refugees
and migrants could always re-enter the
agenda, questioning the stability of any
future coalition government.
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